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Abstract
This paper analyzes the role of specialized high-skilled labor in the
growth of the service sector as a share of the total economy. Empirically,
we emphasize that the growth has been driven by the consumption of
services. Rather than being driven by low-skill jobs, the importance of
skill-intensive services has risen, and this has coincided with a period of
rising relative wages and quantities of high-skilled labor. We develop
a theory where demand shifts toward ever more skill-intensive output
as income rises, and because skills are highly specialized this lowers the
importance of home production relative to market services. The theory
is also consistent with a rising level of skill and skill premium, a rising
relative price of services that is linked to this skill premium, and rich
product cycles between home and market, all of which are observed in the
data.
1 Introduction
Two of the most salient, interesting trends in the post-1950 U.S. economy have
been the rising importance of the service sector and the growth in the premium
to skill despite a large expansion in the relative supply of high-skilled workers.
The growth of the service sector and the relative demand for high-skilled work-
ers have been well-studied independently, but theorists have not formally linked
the two phenomena. Lacking theory, political rhetoric and alarmist concerns
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1that the rise of the service economy has replaced industrial work with low-
skill, low-paying services (e.g., "McJobs") have arisen. This paper addresses
these concerns, and complements the two existing strands of literature, by both
documenting the relevant facts and providing a theoretical framework for un-
derstanding the connection between skill accumulation and the growth of the
service sector. Contrary to the conventional view, we argue that the growth
in services is driven by the movement of consumption into more skill-intensive
output.
Several empirical trends involving services and skills motivate our analysis.
The share of the service sector in value-added has grown steadily from 60 percent
in 1950 to 80 percent in 1980, and this increase is explained by the growth in the
consumption of services. This twenty percentage point increase is also explained
entirely by the growth of skill-intensive services, and is contemporaneous with
an increasing relative quantity of high-skilled labor and a rising skill premium:
The output of high-skill industries increases by more than twenty-￿ve percent,
while the share of low-skill industries actually declines. Over the same period,
the wages of college-educated workers rose from 125 percent to more than twice
the wage of high school-educated workers, and the fraction of workers who were
college-educated rose from just ￿fteen percent to over sixty percent. Finally,
the growth in college-educated labor, the skill premium, the relative size of
skill-intensive services, and the share of the service sector all accelerate around
1950.
Our key theoretical idea linking these three phenonomena is that skills are
specialized, and specialization plays an important role in the decision between
home and market provision of services. General skills increase the productivity
of workers equally in all activities. In contrast, specialized workers are highly
productive on the market, but less productive in other work, including almost
every potential home production activity. Thus, service output for which spe-
cialized labor is relatively productive will tend to be market purchased by all
consumers. Moreover, given the higher opportunity cost of their time, special-
ized workers will tend to purchase a wider range of services on the market.
We incorporate this idea into a growth model. Agents face three stages of
decisions. First, they decide whether or not to become high-skilled. Since the
acquisition of any particular skill entails paying a ￿xed cost, each agent chooses
to attain specialized skills in at most one service. The marginal cost of attain-
ing skill is increasing in the fraction of agents who become high-skilled so that
there is an upward sloping supply of high-skilled workers. Second, agents have
preferences over a continuum of individual services, each of which is satiable.
They order their wants, and satiate these desires sequentially, starting with
the least complex, and therefore cheapest, ￿rst. Each want is produced using
intermediate manufactured inputs and labor in a ￿nal stage. We refer to this
￿nal stage as the production of services. Finally, for each want that they satisfy,
agents further decide whether to home produce or market purchase the service.
Market production has potential cost advantages due to the use of more produc-
tive specialized skills, but home production is more customized and therefore
provides more utility.
2The driving force of growth in the model is exogenous technical change, but
this technical change is both skill- and sector-neutral. Instead, the changing
margin between home production and market services arises from the movement
toward the consumption of services for which high-skilled labor has a larger rela-
tive productivity advantage. As labor productivity grows, income rises, and the
consumption set expands to ever more complex (costly) services. For the more
necessity services consumed at low incomes, high-skilled workers hold a stable
absolute advantage in production. In this initial stage, the skill premium, the
fraction of workers becoming high-skilled, and the share of services are therefore
stable. Eventually, however, demand begins shifting continually toward services
for which high-skilled workers hold an ever larger productivity advantage.
The increased importance of specialized high-skilled labor leads to the rise of
the service economy. We identify four related forces leading to the rising impor-
tance of services. The ￿rst two combine to shift the real consumption bundles
of individual agents toward market services. First, for ￿xed relative prices and
wages, higher income shifts consumption towards services in which high-skilled
labor has a comparative advantage. These skill-intensive market services have
a larger cost advantage over their home production counterparts, and so the
share of market services in consumption rises for every agent. Second, an in-
crease in the demand for high-skilled labor tends to increase the relative wage of
high-skilled agents, which increases their opportunity cost of home production,
reinforcing their shift toward market consumption. A third force that leads
to the growth in real services is a compositional e⁄ect. As more agents be-
come high-skilled, total consumption can shift toward high-skilled workers who
consume a higher share of market services. Finally, a rising relative wage of
high-skilled workers increases the relative price of services, which increases their
current-value share.
The non-homotheticity toward skill-intensive output is consistent with the
observed compositional shift toward skill-intensive services. Our story has ad-
ditional implications, however, which we examine. First, in the model, the
shift in demand manifests itself as an increase in both the relative price and
relative quantity of services. In the data, the growth in the relative shares of
services is indeed driven by both quantities and prices. Second, in the model,
the relative price of services rises because of the rising relative price of a scarce
resource, high-skilled labor. We show that there is a strong, positive time-series
relationship between the skill premium and the relative price of services.
The model has also rich implications on the nature of product cycles of
activities from market to home, and from home to market production. As
income rises, individual purchase new market produced services. At the same
time, as the cost advantage of market services declines with neutral productivity
growth, the lost utility from market services becomes more important and so
previously market-produced services become home-produced. Recent examples
of market to home product cycles include medical acticivities like checking blood
sugar/ pressure or home dialysis. At the same time, the home production of
other services move into the market as generations of low-skilled workers are
replaced by high-skilled workers with high opportunity costs, and consumption
3basket weighted toward market services.
Though policy evaluation is not the focus of this paper, we conjecture that
the model would have di⁄erent implications than existing theories in several
areas, including the elasticity of labor supply and productivity growth. The
home-market decision makes labor supply more elastic than otherwise, but this
elasticity may fall as market production becomes more skill-intensive. This
would have implications for the welfare costs of distortions to labor supply or
the service sector (relative to Rogerson, 2008). The model also illustrates that
service sector growth need not rely on slower productivity growth in the service
sector. Hence, our theory has no ￿Baumol￿ s disease￿implications of slower long
run growth prospects (Baumol, 1967).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We conclude this introduction
with a review of related literature. Section 2 then establishes the facts that
motivate our analysis. The model and theoretical results are presented in Section
3. We evaluate testable implications of the model vis-a-vis the data in Section
4, and Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper is related to a vast existing literature on structural change, for which
we provide a (very) incomplete summary in order to delineate our relative con-
tribution.
Earlier discussions of the facts and explanations for the changes in the struc-
ture of production include Clark (1941), Stigler (1956), Kuznets (1957), Baumol
(1967), Chenery and Syrquin (1975), Fuchs (1968), Kravis et. al. (1984), and
Maddison (1987). They observed an early growth of the employment share
of the service sector, and posited that a combination of biased productivity
rates and non-homothetic preferences and were important in explaining labor
shifts across sectors. A recent literature has adapted these ideas to explain long
run structural change within models that are consistent with Kaldor facts (e.g.,
Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie, 2001, Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 2008, and Ngai and
Pissarides, 2007). We complement this literature by studying the role human
capital as a driving force of structural change. This approach helps address a
series of empirical observations, including the late rise of the share of services
in value-added, the skill composition of services, and the joint movement of rel-
ative prices and quantities. We also focus on output and consumption rather
than the allocation of raw labor.
There is also an existing literature on the role of the home vs. market
production. Ngai and Pissarides (2008) and Rogerson (2008) are two recent
contributions examining the role of home production in explaining the labor
market shift toward services.1 They model di⁄erential rates of productivity
growth across market and home production sectors in order to explain labor
movements. Greenwood et al. (2005) also emphasize technological change in
1A related literature has emphasized the role of home production in less developed
economies, including an emphasis on structural change out of agriculture (e.g., Gollin, et
al, 2004, Buera and Kaboski, 2008).
4the home, but their focus is on the the growth of the female labor force rather
than the service sector. Buera and Kaboski (2008) argue that a rising opti-
mal scale of production has caused structural reallocations across home and
market, and broad sectors of the economy. Locay (1990) analyzes the role of
customization and scale in the home vs. market decision. Finally, the work
by de Vries (1994) emphasizes the changes between home and market produc-
tion over development, including the importance of two-way movements, with
market production rising in the early stages of the industrious revolution, and
home production gaining importance with the decline in female market labor
in the latter phases of the industrial revolution. This paper complements these
papers by analyzing the relationship between home-production, human capital
acquisition, and the service sector.
Our analysis of human capital is related to several other papers, however.
Becker and Murphy (2007) examine the e⁄ect of general, rather than special-
ized, human capital on non-market productivity. Caselli and Coleman (2001)
use human capital accumulation to explain discrepancies in labor and output
trends in the decline of agriculture. Kaboski (2009) shows that human capital
investments are often related to reallocations of labor across industries. Our
paper￿ s emphasis on the role of specialization, home vs. market-production,
and the feedback on services is unique.
Our particular non-homothetic preferences build on those of Matsuyama
(2000, 2002), Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), and Zweimueller (2000)
in their work on structural change. These preferences have shown to be a
tractable way of modeling non-homotheticities over dissagregated components
of consumption. Our twist is to introduce a decision between home and market
production. Hall and Jones (2007) provide an important contribution in explain-
ing the underlying non-homotheticity for one important area of consumption:
healthcare. Our model of disaggregated activities and non-homothetic prefer-
ences is also closely related to Foellmi and Zweimueller (2005). Their analysis
posits a direct preference explanation in which hierarchical wants are satis￿ed
￿rst as agriculture, then industry, and ￿nally services. Our model has no direct
exogenous non-homotheticity toward services, but we emphasize how this can
arise endogenously through the home production margin and a non-homothetic
shift toward skill-intensive wants. Finally, given our focus on the consumption
of heterogeneous services, with more complex, newer ones contributing to the
rise of the service economy, our paper relates to the earlier work by Katouzian
(1970).
2 Empirics
This section provides empirical motivation for our analysis of the link between
skill accumulation and the growth in the relative size of the service sector.2 We
review evidence on the delayed acceleration in services, extend this evidence by
2Our data, source documentation and calculations are avaiable at http://kaboski.econ.ohio-
state.edu/servicesdataappendix_AERrevision.xls.
5showing that growth in services is accounted for by growth in the consumption
of services, and establish that this acceleration occurs at a particular income
threshold.3 We then establish that growth in the service share subsists almost
exclusively in skill-intensive services, and then discuss the fact that the timing
of the growth in services coincides with two well-known trends in the literature:
the spread of college-education and the rising return to skill.
Figure 1 shows a strong mid-century break in the current-value shares of
services in consumption and value-added in the United States. Consumption
data is based on ￿nal output purchases by consumers. Data is ￿rst available
from Lebergott (1996) in 1900, while the data post-1929 are based on national
income and product (NIPA) accounts. The value-added data is from Martin
(1939) from 1869 to 1920, the only source to give value-added in current values
for the full service sector, and from NIPA accounts after 1929. For the value-
added data, we show a broad measure of services (including those provided
by government, public utilities and transportation), but the same substantial
trend exists in more narrow concept of services as well. The 25 percentage
point di⁄erence in the levels of the series is a result of consumption services
excluding government services and distribution services (i.e., retail, wholesale
and transportation services) on goods, both of which are included in services
in the value-added data. The two series are roughly parallel but consumption
actually exhibits the larger absolute increase from 1950 to 2000. Our model is
a model of the consumption of services and the home production margin, so we
stress that growth in services is accounted for by growth in their consumption.4
The break point after which growth in share of services accelerates is common
to many countries. In the U.S., this breakpoint coincides with the year 1950,
but across countries the break is more strongly tied to income per capita than
chronological year. We show this using Buera and Kaboski (2008)￿ s panel data
assembled for 30 countries spanning six continents and constituting two-thirds
of the world￿ s population and eighty percent of global output.5 In 1950, the
U.S. had an income per capita of $9200, in Gheary-Khamis 1990 international
dollars. We divide the sample of country-year observations using this $9200
3Kuznets (1957) noted the late acceleration in the value-added share of services for a small
sample of countries, but it has nevertheless been overlooked in the literature (e.g., Maddison,
1987), probably because raw labor numbers tend to be more readily available.
4Government services are 12 percent in 2000, while transportation, wholesale and retail
together account for 16 percent in 2000. Another di⁄erence between the two series is the
treatment of non-distribution intermediates. The consumption of goods includes value-added
from the service sector, and the consumption of services includes value-added from the goods
sector. The magnitudes and changes in these intermediates approximately net out, however.
5These countries include Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan/Bangladesh, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, United States, and Thailand. Based on Maddison (2006), our data covers:
68 percent of world population and 81 percent of world GDP in 2000; 71 percent and 75
percent, respectively, in 1950; and 40 percent and 60 percent, respectively in 1900. Although
the numbers are lower for 1900, since the longer time series include Western Europe and its
o⁄shoots, we cover a much larger share of the population and economic activity undergoing
large structural change at the time.
6threshold, and then run the following regressions on the low- and high-income
samples:
services share of value-addedi;t = ￿i + ￿ lnyi;t + ei;t (1)
where lnyi;t is log per capital income of country i at time t. ￿i is a country i ￿xed
e⁄ect. (We include to control for level di⁄erences in the series, some of which are
the result of di⁄erences in measurement across countries.6) Here ^ ￿ captures the
e⁄ect of the within country variation of income on the service share. Beyond
the $9200 threshold income, the services share is strongly related to income.
While the estimated coe¢ cient on log income is positive and signi￿cant in both
samples, the coe¢ cient ^ ￿ increases more than three-fold from just 0.06 (std.
error of 0.01) for the <$9200 sample to 0.22 (0.02) for >=$9200 sample. In
contrast, splitting the sample by the year 1950 yields similar coe¢ cients of 0.08
(0.01) before 1950 and 0.11 (0.01) from 1950 on.7
Thus, an acceleration of the share of services in consumption and value-
added at higher incomes appears to a be a common feature of structural trans-
formation. This paper is about growth in the consumption of services, but we
should note that in contrast to the delayed acceleration of services observed
for consumption and value-added, the share of labor in services increases much
more gradually with income per capita, both over time in the U.S. (Ngai and
Pissarides, 2008) and in the cross-section of countries (Kuznets, 1957).8 These
numbers imply large di⁄erences in output per worker across sectors in the ear-
lier period for the U.S (Caselli and Coleman, 2001; Buera and Kaboski, 2009).
If skill levels di⁄er across sectors, the numbers may re￿ ect large discrepancies
between raw labor and e⁄ective labor. Raw labor numbers may not be as infor-
mative for our purposes, especially given our emphasis on human capital. Still,
the reason for the discrepancy between sectoral output and labor allocations
pre-1950 is an open question, and not one that our theory will explain.
Our theory associates the increase in the consumption of market services
with an income e⁄ect toward skill-intensive output, and indeed the growth in
services has been toward skill-intensive services. Figure 2 separates the growth
in services into the contributions of high- and low-skill industries. We rank
industries according to their skill intensity as measured by the fraction of workers
college-educated in 1940 (the last available data preceding the acceleration) and
divide the value-added of the service sector in half in 1950. High-skill industries
are therefore industries with at least 12.5 percent of labor-college educated in
6For example, in several countries utilities cannot be separated from mining and so are
excluded from services. Countries also di⁄er to the extent that small-scale handicrafts are
classi￿ed as services or manufacturing. Another interesting example is China whose historical
data show an extremely low share of services, probably because services were not viewed as
producing value under Marxist ideology. After the Economic Census of 2004, the service share
was revised upwards by nine percentage points in the current o¢ cial data.
7That is, the growth in services appears to be a feature of development rather than driven
by a common shock to the world economy such as a commonly available new technology or
adoption of a common policy.
8The di⁄erence between the labor and value-added trends in a small sample of developed
countries was noticed quite early by Kuznets (1957).
71940.9 We apply the same threshold to map disaggregated components of service
consumption into high- and low-skill. We again see a breakpoint at 1950, and the
rise of the service economy has been clearly driven by high-skill industries. The
importance of low-skill service industries in value-added has actually declined,
though it has remained roughly constant for consumption. Again, distribution
costs account for the discrepancy between consumption and the other measures.
In any case, growth patterns clearly di⁄er across skill-intensity.
We can look at a more disaggregate level, if we focus on labor compensation
data. Labor compensation numbers are nearly identical to value-added num-
bers in Figures 1 and 2, but are available at a more detailed level.10 Figure 3
shows that there are many quantitatively important industries in the growth
of high-skill services. It plots the absolute change in the share of di⁄erent
service industries in total labor compensation between 1950 and 2000 against
the skill-intensity of the industry (measured as the fraction of workers with
college-education in 1940). Again, given available data, this positive relation-
ship appears to be particular to only the high income, post-1950 period.11
The absolute importance of each industry to the total growth in services
is its vertical distance from the zero growth line. The growing high-skill ser-
vices include education (especially higher education), legal services, banking,
real estate and accounting, broadcasting and television, air transportation, and
health care. We emphasize that the growth in services is a broad increase in the
demand for output that is intensive in specialized skills.
Of course, two important industries are health care and education, whose
growth may be driven at least in part by growth in government subsidies or
other policies. While important, however, these industries are simply not the
full story. For example, health and hospitals together account for an almost 8
percentage point increase, but they constitute less than one-quarter of the total
rise in high-skill services, and the ￿ve percentage point increase in education
constitutes less than one-￿fth.
Moreover, the trends we highlight are robust to the exclusion of health care,
education, and government from the data. Namely, the remaining service indus-
tries do not rise until after 1950, but then rise 16 percentage points thereafter,
and growth of the remaining high-skill services (19 percentage points) again
exceeds service growth overall. The remaining consumption categories grow
substantially too, though without health care and education, the increase is
now 8 percentage points, or about half of the growth in value-added.
9These rankings are remarkably stable over time. We could have produced identical results
if we had used data in 2000 to rank industries, but we would need a cuto⁄ of 50 percent.
10Output and consumption share cannot be merged precisely with workforce education
data at this detailed level. The detailed industry and education data comes from IPUMS
census. After 1950, census labor and compensation numbers closely mirror NIPA numbers,
except that census compensation does not include bene￿ts. Using manhours instead of labor
compensation yields a very similar picture.
11Although only a single decade of data are available, census data show absolutely no
relationship between skill-intensity and growth in the share of disaggregated services from
1940 to 1950. At an even more disaggregate level, it is clear that many high-skill services were
simply not consumed in earlier periods.
8More generally, we emphasize that our theory involves not only what is being
demanded, but how it is being delivered. Indeed, even within the categories of
health care and education, there has been a rise in the service economy. Health
care is provided as both services (medical services, hospitals) and commodities
(medical equipment, pharmaceuticals), but the share of services in health care
consumption rose from 77 percent in 1950 to 84 percent in 2000. Similarly,
if we combine educational services and books together, we see that the share
of services in this broad educational consumption category increases from 73
percent in 1950 to 83 percent in 2000.
The broad increase in the demand for skill-intensive output that we propose
should manifest itself in the market for high-skilled labor. We therefore view the
growth in services as related to the well-known post-1950 increase in the demand
for a broad range of ￿high-skilled￿workers (see Juhn, Pierce, and Murphy, 1993).
Using college-educated workers as a proxy for high-skilled workers, Figure 4
shows the growth in the relative price and relative quantity of services. The
average wage of college-educated workers rose from 125 percent of the average
high school-graduate wage in 1950 to over 200 percent by 2000. At the same
time, the ratio of college- to high school-educated labor in the workforce rose
from about ￿fteen percent to sixty percent. The rising disparity between high-
and low-skill workers is of great policy interest. Policy makers and journalists
often argue paradoxically that the falling relative wage of low skill workers is a
result of the growing prevalence of low skill service jobs, but we stress that the
growth in services is a result of the growth in high-skill services.
Based on available evidence for the U.S., the timing of trends involving the
service economy and the market for high-skilled labor correspond. That is, the
year 1950, or the $9200 threshold, appears to be a turning point in terms of
trends related to the schedule for the excess demand for skill. Wage and edu-
cation questions were ￿rst introduced in the 1940 census, and so representative
data are scant before that. There was a sharp decrease in premiums to skill,
including the college-premium between 1940 and 1950. Broader returns to edu-
cation, and other proxies for the skill-premium such as white collar-blue collar
occupation di⁄erentials, did not increase and most likely declined before 1940
(see Goldin and Katz, 1999).
Levels of education and other measures of skill increased well prior to this,
and the growth in skills in the labor force is clearly part of a more continuous
process. Still, we model skill dichotomously, and college education appears to be
a convenient measure of the level of skills associated with the rise of the service
economy.12 The college boom is overwhelmingly a post-1950 phenomenon, since
college educated workers accounted for just 11 percent of the labor force in the
1940 U.S. census. The college boom also coincides with the $9200 threshold
12Empirically, an increase in elementary and high-school education precedes the college
boom. This took place in a time of falling skill premia, suggesting that it could have been,
at least partially driven by an increase in the supply of skills, (see Goldin and Katz, 1999,
Kaboski, 2004). From the point of view of a more general model with multiple levels of high-
skill, these lower levels of education could be viewed as allowing individuals to be specialized
in the production of less complex output, where skill has merely an absolute advantage.
9in other countries as well. Using Cohen and Soto (2007) data, the fraction
of the adult (25+) population of a country that has some college-education
averages just 0.08 (std. dev. of 0.03) at real incomes near $9200. Split-sample
regressions analogous to equation (1) but where the service share is replaced
with the fraction of college-educated adults, yield a ￿ve-fold increase in the
coe¢ cient on log income between the low- and high-income samples, from 0.04
(<$9200) to 0.23 (>=$9200).13 That is, both growth in the service economy
and investment in college education coincide with an income per capita of $9200.
3 Model
In this section, we develop a model of specialized skill accumulation that leads
to the rise (acceleration) of the service economy.
Speci￿cally, we model an economy with a continuum of di⁄erentiated man-
ufactured goods and a continuum of di⁄erentiated services, both indexed by
their complexity, z 2 R+. Manufactured goods are inputs into the production
of services, and services are what individuals ultimately consume. Services can
be produced either in the market or at home. In the latter case, households
directly purchase manufactured goods to home produce services.
In our theory, we posit a utility advantage in consuming home-produced
services, re￿ ecting the household￿ s gains from customizing services to its own
need. On the other hand, the production of services in the market can be more
cost e⁄ective.
Labor is the lone resource in the economy and is either general low-skilled
labor or specialized high-skilled labor. Given a ￿xed time cost of becoming
high-skilled in the production of each di⁄erentiated service, z 2 R+, individuals
choose to specialize in at most one service. The home production of almost all
services will therefore use low-skilled labor. Exogenous productivity improve-
ment is the only source of growth in the economy. For simplicity, we assume
that agents are in￿nitesimally-lived, and so the model is static except for this
technical change.
3.1 Technologies
The technology for producing type-z service output ys (z;t) requires labor and
type-z manufactured goods as intermediates, ym (z;t). Production is Leontie⁄
in intermediates and labor value-added, where high-skilled labor hs(z;t) and
low-skilled labor ls(z;t) are perfect substitutes in producing this value-added:
ys (z;t) = minfAh (z;t)hs (z;t) + Al (z;t)ls (z;t);qym (z;t)g
13For each country, we use all countries with a year of income between $8500-$9500 and
choose the year closest to $9200. In comparison, at this income level, primary education is
nearly complete (the fraction of the adult population averages 0.97), while secondary schooling
is well underway (0.37).
10The levels of productivity of high- and low-skilled workers, Ah(z;t) and
Al (z;t), respectively, are speci￿c to the production of service z. We make
several assumptions regarding these functions:
￿ First, z indexes complexity, so we assume that productivity is decreasing
in z, i.e.,
@Al(z;t)
@z < 0 and
@Ah(z;t)
@z < 0.
￿ Second, for all t, Ah(z;t) > Al(z;t); so that high-skilled labor is more pro-
ductive. Still, since skill is specialized, Ah(z;t) is speci￿c to one particular
z (the agent￿ s specialty), so the high-skilled agent has the low-skilled pro-
ductivity Al(z0;t) for all other output z0 6= z, with Ah (z;t) ￿ Al (z;t) for
all z and t.
￿ Finally, high-skilled labor has a (weak) comparative advantage in the pro-
duction of more complex services, i.e.,
@[Ah(z;t)=Al(z;t)]
@z > (=)0.
This technology can be used to produce services by competitive ￿rms in the
market, or at home by individual households. In the case of home-production,
high-skilled labor can only be used to produce a particular service z if the
household is specialized in the production of that service (e.g., only accountants
use high-skilled labor to process their own taxes).
For simplicity we abstract from the use of intermediates in the production of
manufactured goods, and the output of manufactured goods ym (z;t) is simply
linear in labor:
ym (z;t) = Ah (z;t)hm (z;t) + Al (z;t)lm (z;t)
The production of manufactures can only be done in the market.14
3.2 Firms￿Problem
Given wages, free entry of service and manufacturing ￿rms implies that ￿rms
will price at average cost:



















14See Buera and Kaboski (2008) for an extension of this model in which manufactures are
produced, as is true in the data, using technologies requiring large ￿xed costs and having a
large e¢ cient scale. In this extension, it is not cost-e⁄ective to produce manufactured goods
at the very small scale of home-production.
113.3 Preferences
Agents hold preferences over the continuum of discrete, satiable wants indexed
by the service that satis￿es them, z. Thus, ￿nal consumption takes the form
of services, while manufactured goods are purchase as inputs in the home-
production of services.15 Let the function C (z) : R+ ! f0;1g indicate whether
a particular want is being satis￿ed. Wants can either be satis￿ed by procuring
the service directly from the market, or by purchasing the required manufac-
tured goods and producing the service at home. De￿ne the function H (z) :
R+ ! f0;1g to take the value 1 if want z is satis￿ed by home production and 0
otherwise. Together the set of indicator functions mapping R+ into f0;1g
2 de-
￿nes the consumption set. Preferences over wants and the method of satisfying
those wants, i.e., over indicator functions C (z) and H (z), are represented by




[H (z) + ￿ (1 ￿ H (z))]C (z)dz
where H (z) ￿ C (z). The parameter ￿ 2 (0;1) re￿ ects the utility of market
consumption, which is less than the utility of home-produced consumption be-
cause it is not as customized (e.g., driving precisely when and where you want
rather than riding the bus on ￿xed schedules).
These preferences, though somewhat non-standard, have certain advantages.
First, the continuum of satiable wants is simple way of modeling disaggregate
non-homotheticities that has been used in the existing literature on structural
transformation.16 This disaggregation is not without content and we show, in
Section 4, the extent to which they can be represented in a more standard form,
as preferences over total consumption of goods and services. Also, Matsuyama
(2003) has shown that they can be easily generalized to allow for asymmetries
in the utility provided by satiating di⁄erent wants, in which case our cost of sat-
isfying a particular want can be interpreted as a cost per unit of utility. In any
case, we view the preferences as a simple abstraction capturing shifting demand
patterns and the home production decisions associated with them. As such, the
preferences may be reduced form for a host of idiosyncratic explanations for
changes in disaggregate demand patterns. For example, the growth in demand
for health-related goods and services may stem from a desire to invest in health
capital (as in Hall and Jones, 2007).17 Our emphasis will be on the importance
of skill-intensity in determining whether these are home or market produced,
and these preferences will give parsimonious framework for analyzing a common
dimension to a wide set of micro phenomena.
15One could easily introduce a second continuum of wants that are directly satis￿ed by
manufactured goods, but it would contribute little to the analysis.
16See Murphy et al (1989), Zweimueller (2000), and Matsuyama (2001,2003), for example.
17Indeed, increases in the demand for health- , education-, and ￿nance-related could all be
driven by exogenous increases in life expectancy.
123.4 Schooling
Individuals make a dichotomous education decision e 2 fl;hg; but becoming
specialized high-skilled workers, e = h, requires spending a fraction ￿ of their
time endowment acquiring skills.18 This cost of becoming educated is a con-
tinuous increasing function of f, the fraction of workers who decides to acquire
education, i.e., ￿
0(f) > 0. We assume that ￿(0) = 0, in order to ensure f > 0,
and ￿(1) = ￿ ￿ < 1. The ￿(f) function is a simple way of generating an upward
sloping supply curve for education without introducing underlying heterogene-
ity. One can motivate this in the typical way, where individual agents draw ￿
after choosing their skill level, but are completely insured against their draw.
Thus, high- and low-skilled agents all receive the same utility in equilibrium. In
this interpretation, ￿(f) is the average cost of education as a function of the
fraction of individuals that decide to acquire education.
In principle, agents could acquire skills for multiple z in order to increase
their productivity in home production, but this would never be optimal. Since
the time cost is strictly positive for any strictly positive fraction of agents ac-
quiring skills (i.e., ￿(f) > 0 for any f > 0); in any allocation with positive
high-skilled workers, individuals can acquire specialized skills for at most a ￿-
nite number of services. Given that individuals consume a continuum of them,
this ￿nite number would constitute a measure zero of home-produced services.
Therefore, individuals will acquire skills in at most one service, and the home-
production of all (but a measure zero of) services will be done with low-skilled
productivity.
3.5 Consumer￿ s Problem
The demand for market services and manufactured goods of an individual with
skill e, solves:





























18The key assumption in our analysis of the growth of services will be that the com-
parative advantage of high-skilled labor is increasing after a threshold complexity, i.e.,
@ lnAh(z;t)=@z > 0 for z > 1. An alternative modeling choice that would have allowed
for multiple (a continuum of) skill levels, and assignment of skills to the production of want
of di⁄erent complexity. If skills and complexity are complementary, and equilibrium would
exhibit positive sorting. We choose to abstract from multiple levels of skill and postulate a
dichotomous set of skills as this assumption greatly simpli￿es the analysis.
13Market expenditures are on the left-hand side of the budget constraint, with
the ￿rst term in the integral capturing expenditures on goods used in home
production (Cm), and the second term capturing expenditures on market ser-
vices (Cs). The right-hand side of the budget constraint is labor income. Labor
income is the product of the wage we and labor supplied to the market, both of
which depend on the educational decision e. Labor supply is net of the amount
of time used for schooling ￿(f)I (e), where I (e) is an indicator function that
equals one if e = h and zero otherwise. Market labor supply is also net of home
production time. Note that home production is performed using the low-skilled
productivity, regardless of educational decision e:
Given a marginal utility of consumption ￿, for each z, the consumer decides
to satisfy it (i.e., C(z) = 1) i⁄:







where the left inequality relates to the decision to market consume and the right
inequality is the decision to home produce. Using our knowledge of equilibrium
prices from equations (3) and (2), any z that will be satis￿ed, will be home
produced i⁄:













The right-hand side of expression (6) above captures the di⁄erence in the cost
(in utility terms) of producing the service at home or purchasing on the market.
This di⁄erence is higher for more complex (i.e., high z) services, especially those
that are more e¢ ciently produced on the market using high-skilled labor, and
for agents with high opportunity cost of home production time we. Thus, a want
will be home-produced if the gains from customizing our consumption exceed
the productivity gains from market production.
Recall that wants enter utility symetrically, and production costs, as well
as the additional costs of home production, are increasing in z. Therefore,
consumers will satisfy and home produce the least complex wants ￿rst, and the
consumer￿ s problem can be simpli￿ed to the choice over the restricted consump-
tion set de￿ned by step functions of the type:
C (z) =
￿
1 if z ￿ ￿ ze




1 if z ￿ ze
0 if z > ze
where ￿ ze denotes the most complex want that is satis￿ed, and ze denotes the
most complex want that is home-produced.
Preferences over the restricted consumption set can then be represented as
a utility function over two thresholds ze and ￿ ze :
14u(ze; ￿ ze) = (1 ￿ ￿)ze + ￿￿ ze
with 0 ￿ ze ￿ ￿ ze. On the margin, agents can increase utility in two ways: by
satisfying an additional not-yet-satiated want (i.e., increasing ￿ ze) or by moving
the least expensive market-satis￿ed want into home production (i.e., increasing
ze).
Since the main interest of the paper is the service economy, we focus on
parameters in which market services are purchased in equilibrium. The following









Intuitively, to ensure market services are used, we need the utility of market
services ￿ and cost bene￿ts of market services, governed by the minimum relative
productivity of high-skilled workers, to be su¢ ciently high. The su¢ ciency of
this condition follows from high-skill workers having a comparative advantage
in the production of more complex services, i.e., @ [Ah (z;t)=Al (z;t)]=@z ￿ 0,
and productivity growth being neutral.
An agent chooses to be high-skilled if V h > V l, and vice-versa. Given our
assumptions on ￿(f), only an interior f 2 (0;1) can be an equilibrium, which
will require agent indi⁄erence:
V h = (1 ￿ ￿)zh + ￿￿ zh = (1 ￿ ￿)zl + ￿￿ zl = V l (8)
Although high- and low-skilled workers earn the same utility in equilibrium,
their consumption bundles di⁄er. A higher we in the ￿rst-order condition (6)
above makes the relative cost of home production higher for high-skilled workers
than for low-skilled workers. Substitution leads high-skilled workers to home-
produce fewer services and market consume more services. Moreover, since
agents are indi⁄erent to being high- or low-skilled, the higher wage captures a
pure substitution e⁄ect (see condition 8). Therefore, since all consumers prefer
home-produced services, high-skilled workers consume fewer home-produced ser-
vices but remain indi⁄erent to being low-skilled because they consume a larger
range of services overall.
Proposition 1 High-skill workers consume some market services that low-skill
workers do not consume; zh > ￿ zl, home produce a smaller range of services
zh < zl.








as the market consumption, market
consumption of services, and the services share of market consumption of high-
skilled (low-skilled) agents19, we state the following corollary:
Corollary 2 High-skilled workers spend a larger fraction of their income in
services, ch
s = Ch
















A competitive equilibrium is given by price functions pm (z;t), ps (z;t), w(t),
a fraction of people who attain schooling f, quantities of manufactured goods
and market services determined by zl (t), ￿ zl (t), zh (￿;t), ￿ zh (￿;t), and labor
allocations such that consumers￿ demands and schooling decisions solve (4);
prices solve zero pro￿ts conditions (2) and (3); and labor markets clear.
4 Growth of Services
The dynamics of the model are fully driven by the functions Ah(z;t) and Al(z;t):
In this section, we analyze speci￿cations of these functions that lead to an initial
balanced phase followed by a phase with growth in the share of services, the
fraction of high-skilled workers, and the skill premium. First, we characterize
restrictions on these functions that are consistent with balanced growth as the
result of neutral technical change. We then study a variation in which neutral
technical change shifts demand toward wants in which high-skilled workers have
higher relative productivity. This variation leads to growth in services and has
additional implications about the skill composition, the rising relative price of
services, and product cycles, which we later evaluate relative to the data.
4.1 Balanced Growth
We begin by showing that given our assumptions on Ah(z;t) and Al(z;t), a
power parameterization of these functions is necessary and su¢ cient to generate
balanced growth with a constant share of services in consumption. While the
focus of the paper is the rise of the service economy, we restrict our analysis to
variations on this power parameterization of productivity, since we are interested
in models that can also reconcile the relatively constant share of services in
output and consumption in the pre-1950 data.
Proposition 3 Consider the consumer￿ s problem for workers parameterized by
constants q and ￿ and a strictly positive and strictly decreasing function ~ A(z),
so that Ah (z;t) = ~ A(z) ￿ Alegt and Ah (z;t) = ~ A(z) ￿ Ahegt, and w = ￿ Ah= ￿ Al > 1.
Then, the share of service in consumption cs(t) ￿ Cs(t)=[Cs(t) + Cm(t)] is a
constant for all q and ￿ if and only if ~ A(z) = z￿￿.
Proof. See Appendix
Proposition 3 states that the relative wage is set at the relative productivity
of high- and low-skilled workers, which is common across z. Hence, all ￿rms are
indi⁄erent between using high- and low-skilled workers. (See the cost minimiza-
tion in equations (3) and (2).) In this case, the cost of home producing services
for low-skilled workers is the same as the cost of market purchasing services,
but since ￿ < 1, consumers get more utility from home production. Therefore,
16low-skilled workers consume no market services.20 High-skilled workers face
higher costs to home produce, however, since their wage is higher but not their
productivity in home production, and assumption (7) ensures that they indeed
consume positive market services.
A rough intuition for the above result is that the power function has a
memoryless shape, which keeps the ￿rst-order conditions for the marginal z and
￿ z constant, even as these margins increase linearly. Indeed, one can rewrite the
consumer￿ s problem for the high-skilled agents into a problem with homothetic
























s = wegt (1 ￿ ￿)
We call these ￿quasi￿ -preferences because the preference parameters ￿1, ￿2,
￿3 and ￿ depend on underlying preference and technology, while the ￿price￿
on manufacturing expenditures ph
m is a function of the (constant equilibrium)
wage.21 It is straightforward to see that the above preferences are homothetic,
however, and so the share of services remains constant as income grows. While
the preferences are homothetic with respect to income, consumption patterns
nonetheless vary with respect to the wage/opportunity cost of time through its
e⁄ect on ph
m. That is, a pure wealth e⁄ect (i.e., an increase in income as t
increases) does not a⁄ect the relative shares of service and manufactured goods
consumption, but a higher wage will have a substitution e⁄ect away from man-
ufactured goods (which are inputs into home production) and toward services.
Product Cycles We conclude this section by highlighting an interesting im-
plication of this balanced model for product cycles between home and market
production. As productivity grows, individuals consume new services. In the
case of high-skill workers, they start purchasing these services on the market,
since production of the marginal services is particularly time-consuming, and
the opportunity cost of high-skill workers￿time is too high to be used in low-skill
home-production. Eventually, labor productivity increases enough making the
absolute cost advantage of market-production smaller, and leading individuals
to home produce customized versions of these services which yield higher util-
ity. (See the ￿rst-order equation (6).) That is, there is a clear product cycle of
services being ￿rst market produced and later home produced. This follows nat-
urally from the assumption of a preference for home production, a cost bene￿t
20This result is done for simplicity but is not particularly necessary. Low-skilled workers
could consume services if some wants had ￿ > 1 or if technologies were characterized by
e¢ cient scales greater than the home production scale as in Buera and Kaboski (2008).
21In particular, ￿ = 1 ￿ 1=(￿ + 1), ￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(￿ + 1) ￿ Al=q
￿1=(￿+1), ￿2 =
￿[(￿ + 1) ￿ Al=(1 + q)]1=(￿+1), ￿3 = (1 + q)=q and ph
m = 1 + w=q.
17to market production, and neutral productivity growth. The following remark
formalizes this discussion:
Remark: In an economy with neutral productivity growth where Ae (z;t) =
￿ Aez￿egt, e = l;h, the thresholds de￿ning the demand of low- and high-skill indi-
viduals grow at the constant rate g=(￿ + 1), with zh (t) < zl (t) = ￿ zl (t) < ￿ zh (t).
For high-skill workers, for any particular z, the model yields a product cycle from
not consumed, to purchased on the market, and ￿nally home-produced.
In the variation of the model we discuss in the following section, a richer set
of product cycles arises.22
4.2 Comparative Advantage of Skill in More Complex Out-
put
In this section, we study the growth of the service economy, which arises from
agents satisfying more complex and skill-intensive wants as incomes grow. High-
skilled labor has a comparative advantage in satisfying these wants, hence more
of these services are produced on the market, and the demand for high-skilled la-
bor increases. We proceed by establishing four related e⁄ects that all contribute
to the growth in services. The leading e⁄ect, which drives the others, comes
directly from high-skilled workers having a greater comparative advantage in
more complex output, which we call the high-skill advantage e⁄ect. Two other
e⁄ects, the opportunity cost e⁄ect and skill-deepening e⁄ect, come through the
e⁄ect of comparative advantage on the demand for high-skilled labor. We then
show how comparative advantage-drive sorting leads to growth in skill-intensive
services, and also growth in the relative price of services, the relative price ef-
fect, which also contributes to the growth in the share of services. Finally, we
combine these results, and show that over time these forces lead to growth in
the aggregate share of services in the economy.
The underlying assumption that gives rise to a growing share of services is
that high-skilled labor has a comparative advantage in the more complex goods
and services, which will ￿rst be consumed at a later date given their high cost
of production. Speci￿cally, over a range of less complex (i.e., z < 1) production,
productivity falls with z at a rate ￿l for both low- and high-skilled workers
alike. For the range of more complex output (i.e., z > 1), the productivity falls
more slowly for high-skilled workers than for low-skilled workers. Speci￿cally,
we assume:
Al (z;t) = ￿ Alegtz￿￿l (10)
Ah (z;t) = ￿ Ahegt max
￿
z￿￿l;z￿￿h￿
with ￿h < ￿l.
Given these productivity assumptions, consumption eventually moves into
the z > 1 region where high-skilled workers hold a stronger productivity advan-
22See also Buera and Kaboski (2008) for an analysis of richer, e¢ cient scale-driven product
cycles that are important in the early phase of development.
18tage. This creates a sorting of high-skilled workers into high z activities. When
the wage exceeds 1, there is a strict sorting of all activities into those that are
produced with low-skilled labor, z < ^ z, and those produced with high-skilled
labor. The critical ^ z is the one z at which ￿rms are indi⁄erent between hiring









As the skill premium increases, more of the less complex services and man-
ufactured goods are going to be produced with low-skilled labor. Costs using
high-skilled workers will be equal to low-skilled worker costs at ^ z but strictly
less for z > ^ z.
Chronologically, for low t the economy grows in a balanced fashion with
high-skilled workers satisfying more wants overall but fewer of them on the
market. In this initial phase, the quantity and price of skills remain constant,
as do the shares of services and manufacturing in consumption. We summarize
this below.
Proposition 4 Assume (10). De￿ne t0 as the unique value sastifying ￿ zh (t0) =
1: For t < t0:
(a) zh (t) ￿ zl (t) = ￿ zl (t) < ￿ zh (t) < 1;
(b) cl
s (t) = 0 < cs (t) = cs (0) < ch
s (t) = ch
s (0);
(c) w(t) = ￿ Ah= ￿ Al and f (t) = f (0) 2 (0;1).
4.2.1 Direct E⁄ect of High-Skilled Comparative Advantage
As productivity rises, individuals￿consumption moves into ever more complex
wants, eventually those in which high-skilled labor has a comparative advan-
tage. Indeed, after t0 the most complex want satis￿ed by high-skilled workers
is produced at a lower cost with high-skilled labor, i.e., ￿ zh > 1. At a later
date, the consumption of low-skilled workers also moves in this set of wants,
and it becomes pro￿table for them to purchase market-produced services, i.e.,
1 < zl < ￿ zl. The comparative advantage of high-skilled workers in complexity
creates a direct force leading to the growth in services, which we call the high-
skill advantage e⁄ect. Namely the cost di⁄erence between market and home
production increases with complexity (z) and the share of services in the con-
sumption of both low- and high-skilled workers is increasing. We call the force
direct because the change in consumption patterns exists, even when the relative
wage w and relative prices are held ￿xed. (Note that constant relative prices
imply that current-value consumption shares cl
s and ch
s equal real consumption
shares.) We formalize this e⁄ect below.
Proposition 5 Assume (10) and consider an economy with a ￿xed wage. The
set of want that are satis￿ed, and the set of home-produced wants expands, with




ze(t) > 0, e = l;h. Fur-
thermore, the share of services consumed by low-skilled (high-skilled) individuals
19is non-decreasing, @cl
s (t)=@t ￿ 0 (@ch
s (t)=@t ￿ 0). These inequalities are strict
provided 1 < zl < ￿ zl ( ￿ zh > 1).
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is fairly straightforward. Neutral productivity
growth leads to more wants being satis￿ed and to the home-production of a
larger set of services. As consumption moves into goods and services for which
high-skill labor has a strict comparative advantage, it is cheaper to expand
the set of wants that are satis￿ed than to expand the set of home-produced
wants, since home-production is done with the productivity of low-skilled labor.
Thus, each individual service remains market-produced for longer, implying that
the set of market produced services becomes larger, and the share of services
increases.
Intuition for this result can also be seen from a restatement of the problem
in terms of the quasi-preferences over total expenditures on manufactured goods
and services, respectively. These preferences are now non-homothetic. For ex-
ample, for high-skilled workers with zh < ^ z < ￿ zh, the high-skilled consumer￿ s















s = egtw(1 ￿ ￿)
Again, preference parameters ￿1, ￿2, ￿3, ￿m, ￿s, and ￿ Cs depend on underlying
preferences and technology.23
Two factors lead to a non-homotheticity toward services. First, the Stone-
Geary-like constant Cs is positive if and only if ￿h < ￿l. Second, the exponent
on the term with services, 1 ￿ ￿s, exceeds the exponent on the purely manu-
factured good term if and only if ￿h < ￿l. Perhaps the most interesting fact is
that because these quasi-preferences depend on technology, their shape changes
as consumption moves into services for which high-skill labor has a larger pro-
ductivity advantage. For ￿ zh < 1, the preferences are homothetic as in (9), while
for ￿ zh > 1 they are non-homothetic as in (11). That is, the transition captured
by the disaggregate model cannot be aggregated into stable preferences over
aggregate service and manufactured good expenditures.
4.2.2 E⁄ects that Operate through the Market for High-Skills
With comparative advantage, movement of consumption into more complex
output leads to an increase in the demand for high-skilled workers. This causes
a rise in the equilibrium price and quantity of skills, and a further rise in the
share of services. In this section we highlight these forces.
23In particular, Cs = (1 + n)(￿l ￿ ￿h) ^ z1+￿l=
￿
Al (1 + ￿l)(1 + ￿h)
￿
> 0, ￿m =
1 ￿ 1=(￿l + 1) > ￿s = 1 ￿ 1=(￿l + 1), ￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿




(￿h + 1) ￿ Al=(1 + q)
￿1=(￿h+1), and ￿3, ph
m as de￿ned in (9).
20De￿ne high-skilled labor demand as total (home+market) labor, where the
market uses high-skilled labor for output above a ^ z. Since high z output will
be produced by the high-skilled, the growth in ￿ zh and ￿ zl increases the demand
for high-skilled workers.24 However, the increase in zl can lower the demand
by low-skilled workers for high-skilled labor in market services, if their home
production time rises.
By Walras￿Law, an increase in the total demand for high-skilled labor is
equivalent to a decrease in the total demand for low-skilled labor (since budget
constraints must be satis￿ed.) Hence, a simple and intuitive su¢ cient condition
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The right-hand side of the expression is the net change in low-skilled labor
used in home production, which is the product of the amount of labor used in
home production (term I) and its rate of its increase (term II). The left-hand
side is the decrease in demand for low-skilled labor on the market coming from
the increase in their productivity. Term III is the market labor demanded by
low-skilled workers, and Term IV is the market labor demanded by high-skilled
workers.
One case that clearly satis￿es this condition is as ￿h ! 0, since preferences
become quasilinear and the ze do not change. The condition also holds for any
parameters ￿l < ￿h as t ! 1, since home production time converges to zero
(see Proposition 10).
Proposition 6 Assume (10), (12), and a ￿xed quantity of high-skill individ-
uals, f (t) = f. For any w, the demand for high-skilled labor increases over
time.
An increase in the demand for high-skilled labor, given a ￿xed supply curve
for high-skilled labor, will lead to a rise in the skill premium w: A rise in the
skill premium leads to an increase in the price of home-production relative
to market services for high-skilled individuals. This gives an additional force
towards the rise of services that we label the opportunity cost e⁄ect. The rise
in the opportunity cost causes a decline in the set of home-produced wants and
24The demand for high-skilled labor is perfectly elastic at w = ￿ Ah= ￿ Al, i.e., it is a corre-
spondence. For this case, the demand for high-skill labor increases with productivity in the
sense that the lower bound of the demand correspondence is increasing. The lower bound will
be strictly increasing if ￿ zh > 1.
21an increase in the set of wants that are satis￿ed by high-skilled individuals,
@zh=@w < 0 and @￿ zh=@w > 0. To isolate this e⁄ect, we keep output prices ￿xed
here, so that the current value shares ch
s and cl
s again equal real shares.
Proposition 7 For given prices of goods and services, pm(z;t) and ps(z;t),
the higher the skill premium, the more wants that high-skilled agents satisfy,
but the fewer wants they satisfy through home production, i.e, @￿ zh=@w > 0 and
@zh=@w < 0. Moreover, the share of services in the consumption of high-skilled
agents is increasing in the opportunity cost of their time, @ch
s=@w > 0.
The result that @zh=@w < 0 (i.e., home production and consumption of
manufactured goods fall in absolute terms) is quite strong and deserves further
discussion. An increase in the wage has both an income e⁄ect and a substitution
e⁄ect. The income e⁄ect alone would lead the individual to increase both ￿ zh
and zh, but the above proposition shows that the substitution e⁄ect always
dominates. The reason is that individual are highly substitutable. Given our
assumption that preferences over individual wants are linear with a satiation
point, substitutability depends on how quickly the costs change with z. The
higher ￿h is the harder it is to substitute between lower z (home-produced) and
higher z (market-purchased) output, since costs increases rapidly. One can see
the relationship between the elasticity of substitution and ￿h from the quasi-
preferences in (9).25 The elasticity of substitution between total expenditure
on services and manufacturing is 1
￿ = ￿+1
￿ . As ￿ ! 1, the lowest degree of
substitutability is Cobb-Douglas. Thus, for any ￿nite ￿, the substitution e⁄ect
will always dominate, and a higher relative wage lowers the amount of home
production done by high-skilled workers.
In equilibrium, an outward-shifting demand for skilled labor will also result
in an increase in the quantity of high-skilled labor f, provided that the supply
of skilled-labor is upward sloping, i.e., @￿=@f < 1. Recall that Corollary 2
stated that services are a higher share of consumption for high-skilled workers
than low-skilled workers. Thus, this compositional change of the workforce can
also increase the share of services. We call this the skill-deepening e⁄ect.26
Another potential e⁄ect of skill-deepening, not present in the model, is the
direct increase in services coming from educational expenditures. This is not
present in the model, since the only cost of schooling is the time cost/foregone
labor, but could easily be captured by making schooling Leontie⁄ in foregone
25A similar intuition can be gleaned from the non-homothetic case in equation (11), though
the mapping of the elastiicty of substitution is less straightforward.
26In general, there could also be a shift in the supply curve of high-skill workers. For
example, after ￿ zh crosses 1, due to the non-homothetic nature of the budget set, high-skill
individuals face a more attractive consumption expansion path than low-skill individuals, and
more individuals are willing to acquire skills for any given skill-premium. This e⁄ect will
reinforce the increase in the equilibrium quantity of high-skill workers. At the same time, this
e⁄ect could temporarily cause a decline in the skill premium, a counteracting force against the
rise in the share of services. Furthermore, an increase in f itself does not necessarily lead to
a compositional increase in services, since f could increase without the high-skilled increasing
their share of market income. This could happen because the wage could decrease, or not
increase enough to o⁄set the forgone labor from education.
22labor and purchased educational services. Such a modi￿cation would be impor-
tant in a quantitative analysis.
4.2.3 Skill Intensity and the E⁄ect on the Relative Price of Services
A higher skill premium (w > ￿ Ah= ￿ Al) will also imply a well-de￿ned pattern of
specialization where the most complex good and service are produced by high-
skilled workers with ^ z > 1. We show below that given this higher skill premium
and given some consumption of market services produced by low-skilled workers
(implied by zh (t) < ^ z), the services produced by low-skilled labor will decline,
while market services produced with high-skilled labor will grow. This result is
(qualitatively) consistent with the changing composition of the service industry
presented in Figure 2 of Section 2.
The following proposition establish this results:
Proposition 8 Assume (10), w(t) = w > ￿ Ah= ￿ Al, and zh (t) < ^ z, then @Csjl=@t <
0 and @Csjh=@t > 0, where Csjl (Csjh) is the quantity consumed of services pro-
duced with low-skilled (high-skilled) labor.27
Proof. See Appendix.
The sorting of high-skill individual into the production of high z goods and
services predicts that market services are more skill-intensive than manufac-
tured goods on average, since both high and low z manufactured goods will be
produced on the market, but low z services will be produced at home. As the
relative wage of high-skilled labor increases, the model therefore also predicts
an increase in the relative price of services. Thus, while the earlier results have
highlighted forces leading to increases in the real share of services, the model
also predicts an increase in the aggregate relative price of services. This increas-
ing relative price is a fourth channel through which the current value share of
services grows. We state this formally below.
We start by de￿ning our price indices Ps(t;￿) and Pm(t;￿) as the values
of the time ￿ consumption baskets of services and manufactured goods, respec-
tively, evaluated at time t prices.28 We then de￿ne ￿s=m(t) as the instantaneous
percentage change in the relative price of the service basket relative to the man-
ufactured good basket at time ￿ is then ￿s=m(t) =
@[Ps(t;￿)=Pm(t;￿)]=@t
Ps(t;￿)=Pm(t;￿) j￿=t :29
Proposition 9 If w(t) > ￿ Ah= ￿ Al and @w(t)=@t > 0; then ￿s=m(t) > 0.





Z maxf^ z;￿ zhg
maxfzh;^ zg
ps(z)dz + (1 ￿ f)
Z maxf^ z;￿ zlg
maxf^ z;zlg
ps(z)dz:
28Speci￿cally, Ps(t;￿) = f(￿)
Z ￿ zh(￿)
zh(￿)











29This corresponds to changes in a relative price index constructed from continous time
chain-weighted price indexes, where the indices are continously chained.
23Proof. See Appendix.
4.2.4 Aggregate Growth in the Share of Services
Using a common time scale, Figures 5 and 6 illustrates a simulated example of
the above dynamics in the service share of consumption, relative wage, fraction
becoming high-skilled, and fraction of time spent on home production. The
simulation is not quantitative but purely illustrative.30;31
In our characterization, we have identi￿ed four related forces leading to
the rise of services, all of which are the result of consumption expanding into
goods and services for which high-skill labor has a productivity advantage. We
therefore decompose the growth in services in the top panel into these four
elements.
￿ The diamonds show the increase in the real share of services in consump-
tion for ￿xed wages and ￿xed quantity of skills. That is, this is the high-
skill advantage e⁄ect from Proposition 5.
￿ The circles give the response of the real share of services once we also
adjust the skill-premium in agents￿maximization. That is, it includes the
opportunity cost e⁄ect from Proposition 7.
￿ The solid line show the combined e⁄ect on the real share of services as we
further allow for the increase in the quantity of skills. That is, it includes
the skill deepening e⁄ect.
￿ The above three lines have looked at real consumption in that they have
been valued at the initial prices, w(0) = ￿ Ah= ￿ Al. The dashed line shows
the full e⁄ect on the current value share after we allow for the relative
price e⁄ect from Proposition 9.
In the limit the relative wage grows unbounded, all agents become high-
skilled, and the share of services in consumption converges to one.32 The fol-
lowing proposition summarizes the assymptotic behavior of the economy.
Proposition 10 Assume (10). As t ! 1;
(a) all workers become high-skilled, limt!1 f (t) = 1;
(b) the relative wage converges to 1=
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
> ￿ Ah= ￿ Al;
(c) both the sets of satis￿ed and home-produced wants grow in the limit, but
30The parameter values behind the simulation reported in Figure 5 are: ￿ Al = 1, ￿ Ah = 1:2,
￿l = 1:5, ￿h = 1; ￿ = 0:98, q = 1, g = 0:02, and ￿ (f) = (1=￿)f￿, with ￿ = 0:9. In this
simulation, the rise of services starts after the period t = 40, when ￿ zh crosses 1; but the rise
of services only become signi￿cant once zl < ￿ zl after the period t = 49.
31The transitions has several kinks which could easily be smoothed by allowing for hetero-
geneity in wealth or earnings as in a previous version of the model.
32The skill deepening e⁄ect makes it di¢ cult to fully characterize the transition path of
aggregate services and the skill premium, as discussed in Footnote 26. That said, in all of the
numerical examples that we explore, the transitions of the service share, relative wage, and
the fraction high-skilled are all monotone.
24the set of satis￿ed wants grows at a higher rate, i.e., 0 < limt!1
:
ze (t)=ze (t) <
limt!1
:
￿ ze (t)=￿ ze (t) = g=(￿h + 1), and home production time converges to zero,
limt!1
R ze(t)
0 z￿l= ￿ Aldz = 0, for e = l;h;
(d) the share of services in consumption converges to one, limt!1 cs (t) = 1,
and the share of services in value-added to a number strictly less than one,
limt!1 ys (t)= 1
1+q.33
Product Cycles, Market-to-Home and Home-to-Market Along with
the rise of the service economy, the model generates a rich set of product cy-
cles. The earlier product cycle of not consumed ! market consumed ! home-
produced remains for some services. In addition, however, the production of
some services transition from being home-produced by low-skilled workers to
market produced, as more individuals become high-skill. Furthermore, in an
initial phase, the home-production of service by high-skilled individuals can
decline with the increase in the skill-premium.
Indeed, if we assume that for high-skilled workers complexity does not a⁄ect
their productivity, i.e., ￿h = 0, then the set of services home produced by
high-skill individuals shrinks along the transition with the increase in the skill-











In this case, the set of home-produced goods by high-skill individuals is in￿ u-
enced by the skill-premium and not directly by technical change.
5 Additional Implications
This section evaluates the additional implications of the assumption of compar-
ative advantage of skill in more complex output and discuss evidence consistent
with this explanation playing a role. In particular, the growth in the share of
services relative to goods is driven by both growth in the relative real quantity
of services but also the relative price of services. This growth in the relative
price of services is also tightly linked with the skill premium. Finally, examples
of product cycles ￿tting our story abound.
Figure 7 plots the growth in the current-price output (i.e., value-added)
of services relative to commodities, and decomposes it into the growth in the
measured relative price of services, and the growth in the relative real quantity
of services (after de￿ ating). Both relative quantities and relative prices show
a positive trend, and both play a substantial role in the overall growth of the
relative share in services.34
33Speci￿cally, ys = Ys=(Ys + Ym), where Ys = 1
1+qCs and Ym = Cm +
q
1+qCs.
34Lee and Wolpin (2006) established the same facts but over a shorter period of 1968-2000.
25This decomposition is introduced with the caveat that changes in prices are
measured imperfectly because of changes in quality over time. Quality improve-
ments exist for both goods and services, but the rates of change and ability to
control or adjust for quality may also vary across sectors. Moreover, many real
quantities of services are only measured implicitly, and indeed Bosworth and
Triplett (2007) and Griliches (1992) argue that growth in the real quantity of
services is understated, and price growth is therefore overstated. Indeed, al-
though we ￿nd a similar pattern for the relative prices and quantities of the
consumption of goods and services, a much larger share of growth is in relative
prices. Nonetheless, all available data show an increase in both the relative real
quantity and the relative price of services between 1950 and 2000.
An increase in both relative quantities and relative prices is consistent with
a demand explanation. In our comparative advantage model, the increase in
demand for services stems from an increase in the demand for complex output.
Again, the reason relative prices increase in the comparative advantage story
is that the sorting of workers causes market services to be more skill-intensive.
The rising relative wage therefore leads to a greater increase in the relative price
of services.
Figure 8 shows the wage of college-educated workers relative to high-school
educated workers together with the relative price of services over time for the
United States. We have normalized the two to be equal in year 1940. There
appears to be a tight relationship between the two. In particular, the decade-to-
decade ￿ uctuations mirror each other, and the percentage movements are even
of similar magnitude.35
Another novel implication of the model is our prediction of rich product
cycles. Recall that the model allows for movement of productive activities out
of the home as the opportunity cost of time rises. This marketization of home
production and its e⁄ect on the service sector has been modeled by Ngai and
Pissarides (2008) and Rogerson (2008). Examples of such activities include child
care, elderly care, lawn care, and substituting restaurant meals for home cooked
meals, all of which are plausibly driven by rising opportunity costs of time among
high-skilled workers. The more novel and surprising implication, however, is
the prediction that as the costs of producing fall, the preference for the bene￿ts
associated with home production will move activities from the market to the
home. The model predicts that the higher the productivity advantage of high-
skilled labor, the longer the product cycle, which could make many product
cycles di¢ cult to discern. Still, there are numerous examples of this product
cycle, even among skill-intensive activities such as medicine and education. For
example, in health care, patients now do home dialysis, check blood sugar levels
35The growth in the skill premium after 1970 coincides with the well-known slowdown in
measured productivity growth. Our model may not be consistent with a rapidly rising skill
premium during a time of slower productivity growth, though this will certainly depend on
the particular form of the ￿(f): In any case, the literature has proposed several explanation
(e.g., Caselli, 1999, Greenwood and Yorukoglu, 1997) for these joint phenomena, including
mismeasurement of productivity growth, and our model is consistent with a rising share of
service and relative price of services during a period of rising skill premium.
26and give insulin shots.36 In education, self-guided foreign language instruction
now exists, and home schooling is a small but rapidly growing segment of the
education market, particularly primary schooling.37 Again, for these examples
the utility bene￿t of home production appears to play a role.
6 Conclusions
To explain the rise of the service economy in the U.S. over the last half cen-
tury, we have focused on the household￿ s decision between home production and
market production in explaining the rise of the service economy. Modeling this
margin has yielded insight into understanding the high-skill nature of the rising
service economy.
As mentioned in the introduction, we conjecture that our model would have
particular implications for several policy-relevant issues. First, the model has
a rich theory of labor supply and its elasticity. We have avoided reference
to female labor supply, which has strongly impacted the U.S. labor market
over the period studied, and is of great importance in considering the home
production vs. market purchase margin. Indeed, labor supply decisions has
been recently linked to the growth in services (Lee and Wolpin, 2006). Second,
we have mentioned government subsidies that exist in important growing service
industries like education and health care. A detailed quantitative analysis of
how such subsidies a⁄ect the margin between home and market production
along the lines of Rogerson (2008) would be of great interest. Third, our theory
can explain both the rising share of services and rising relative price of services
without requiring slower productivity in services. Indeed, slower productivity
growth in services would tend to lessen the quantitative implications of our
theory for structural change. On the other hand, if productivity growth in
services is understated, and comparable or higher than that in manufacturing,
then our model has greater potential in quantitatively reconciling structural
change and the (smaller) increase in the relative price of services. All of these
questions are subjects of ongoing research.
36See Blagg (1997, 2006) for a discussion of home dialysis.
37Princiotta and Bielick (2006) document the recent growth in the prevalence of home
schooling.
27A Characterization of the Consumer￿ s Budget
Set
In this section we characterize the properties of the budget set for the case
where high-skilled labor has a (weak) comparative advantage in the production








Ah(z) < 0, and market production








budget set is given by the following inequality:
F (ze; ￿ ze) ￿ 0 (13)
where














dz ￿ ￿I (e)
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Provided that the function F (:;:) is concave, condition (13) de￿nes a convex
set. In the case 1
Al(ze;t) > w

























@ze ; the budget set is guaranteed




Al(￿ ze;t) < w
Ah(￿ ze;t).
B Proofs of Results in the Paper
Proof of Proposition 3. We ￿rst show the su¢ ciency of ~ A(z) = z￿￿. Given
~ A(z) = z￿￿; after substituting in for equilibrium prices and integrating, the
28problem of a high-skilled individual with neutral productivity egt simpli￿es to:
max
0￿zh(t)￿￿ zh(t)
(1 ￿ ￿)zh (t) + ￿￿ zh (t)
s.t.







￿+1 = ￿ Alegt (1 ￿ ￿)
From the ￿rst-order conditions of this problem we obtain:








Substituting (14) into the expression for the share of services in consumption,
we obtain the desired result of a constant service share for high-skill individuals,
































￿ Ah= ￿ Al￿1
￿(￿+1)=￿







￿ Ah= ￿ Al￿1
￿(￿+1)=￿￿.
The overall share of services is:
cs(t) =
fCh
s (t) + (1 ￿ f)Cl
s(t)
fCh(t) + (1 ￿ f)Cl (t)
Since Cl
s(t) = 0, w = ￿ Ah= ￿ Al and therefore f, and Ch(t)=Cl (t) are constant, we
have shown that cs(t) is constant.
We next show that ~ A(z) = z￿￿ is a necessary condition for a constant share of
services. From the individual￿ s decision problem, we obtain the following two
restrictions, the budget constraint:










= ￿ Alegt (1 ￿ ￿), (15)





￿ Ah= ￿ Al ￿ 1
~ A(￿ zh (t))
~ A(zh (t))
. (16)
An additional equation is given by the condition requiring that the share of


















29Totally di⁄erentiating (17) gives:
dzh (t)
~ A(zh)
(1 + q ￿ cs) =
d￿ zh (t)
~ A(￿ zh)
(1 + q ￿ cs (1 + q)). (18)




1 + q ￿ cs (1 + q)
(1 + q ￿ cs)
1 + q




￿ zh (t) = a + bzh (t) (19)




￿ Ah= ￿ Al￿1
1￿￿
￿ < 1. Furthermore, a = 0 since
otherwise cs must equal zero for su¢ ciently large or low income. Together, (16),
(19), and a = 0 imply:
~ A0 (bzh (t))
~ A(bzh (t))
bzh (t) =
~ A0 (zh (t))
~ A(zh (t))
zh (t) (20)
Since (20) must hold for any b ￿ 1 (as we vary q and ￿) and all zh (t) (as we vary
t), for any z the left-hand side must be a constant, call it ￿: Simple integration




~ A(z) = z￿
To prove Proposition 5 we ￿rst establish the following lemma characterizing
the evolution of individual thresholds, for a ￿xed wage, as productivity grows.
Lemma 11 Assume (10) and consider an economy with a ￿xed wage. The set
of wants that are satis￿ed and the set of home-produced wants expand, with the




ze(t) > 0, e = l;h.





ze(t) (in the following discussion, since the wage
is assume to be constant, individual thresholds are only a function of time
through technology). Given Assumption 7, this can only be the case for low-
skill individuals.
In the case of an interior solution, this lemma follows from log-di⁄erentiation
of the ￿rst order condition. There are three interior cases to consider: (i)
ze (t) < ￿ ze (t) < ^ z (all wants consumed by type e are produced with low-skill
labor), (ii) ze (t) < ^ z < ￿ ze (t) (market services consumed by type e are produced
with both low and high-skill labor), (iii) ^ z < ze (t) < ￿ ze (t) (all market services
consumed by type e are produced with high-skill labor).
30Case (i) Given ze (t) < ￿ ze (t) < ^ z, the dynamics of individual follows from the




ze(t) = g=(￿l + 1).






￿l = ￿ Al ￿ min
n
ze (t)
￿l = ￿ Al;wze (t)
￿h = ￿ Ah
o
(1 + q)wze (t)
￿h = ￿ Ah
. (21)
Case (ii): Given zh (t) < ^ z < ￿ zh (t) (for low-skill individuals, e = l, the only
relevant case is ^ z ￿ ze (t), as low-skilled workers will never strictly prefer to
purchase market services produced by low-skilled workers, since ￿ < 1), log-

















￿l = ￿ Al ￿ wze (t)
￿h = ￿ Ah
wez
￿l
e = ￿ Al ￿ wz
￿h







Proof of Proposition 5. We use the results on the dynamics of individual
thresholds from the previous lemma to characterize the evolution of the share
of services for each type, given a ￿xed wage, as productivity grows. The share























￿ Al ;w z￿h
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For the case of a corner solution, ze (t) = ￿ ze (t), we trivially get that the share
of services is constant. For Case (i) from the above lemma, the analysis of
Proposition 3 applies, and we also get a constant share of services for both
types.
We are left with Cases (ii) and (iii) from the above lemma.
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> > > > =
> > > > ;
31replacing Ch (t) = Ch
m (t) + Ch










































￿ Al dz = q
zh(t)
￿l+1
￿ Al(￿l+1) and Ch


































































































































+q (1 + q)zh (t)
￿l+1 ^ z￿h+1dzh
w(￿l￿￿h)





where the last inequality uses that ￿l > ￿h.
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Using that ￿ ze (t)
￿h+1 @￿ ze(t)=@t
￿ ze(t) ￿ze (t)
￿h+1 @ze(t)=@t
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Proof of Proposition 6. Taking as given the quantity of high-skill individuals
(f), the demand for high-skill labor (fd (w;t)) as a function of the skill premium
and the level of technology (we use time as an index of technology, as technology
is a monotone function of time, egt) equals
fd (w;t) = (1 ￿ f) ￿ fd
l (w;t) + f ￿ fd
h (w;t)
where fd
e (w;t) is the demand of high-skill labor associated with the consumption
of individuals with skill e (to save on notation we don￿ t explicitly write the
dependence of the individual thresholds on the skill premium). If w = ￿ Ah= ￿ Al;
fd





































where the lower bound is the case where high-skilled labor is used only if it has
a strict cost-advantage, and the upper bound is when it is used whenever their
33is indi⁄erence. If w > ￿ Ah= ￿ Al, e = l;h.
fd







dz + (1 + q)











In the following discussion we concentrate on the case w > ￿ Ah= ￿ Ah, but a similar
argument can be use to prove that the lower and upper bound of the high-skilled
demand correspondence at w = ￿ Ah= ￿ Al increase over time.
Using the budget constraint of low-skilled individuals, fd
l (w;t) can be written
as the di⁄erence between the labor endowment and low-skilled labor demanded
over the wage:
fd




































































































































1(^ z > zh (t)),

























































































































where the last inequality follows from our su¢ cient condition, condition (12).
Proof of Proposition 7. In this proposition, the price of goods and market
services were assumed ￿xed in order to concentrate on the e⁄ect of changes in
the opportunity cost of time for high-skilled workers. This amounts to holding
￿xed the cost of high-skilled labor when pricing market goods and services, i.e.,
pm (z) = min
￿
z￿l= ￿ Al; ￿ wz￿h=Ah
￿
and ps (z) = (1 + q)pm (z;t), where ￿ w denotes
the cost of high-skilled labor implicit in the pricing of goods and market services.
We use w to denote the opportunity cost of time faced a high-skilled individual.
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(1+q) ￿ w￿ z
￿h
h =Ah
if zh ￿ maxf1; ^ zg < ￿ zh
wz
￿l
h =Al￿ ￿ wz
￿h
h =Ah
(1+q) ￿ w￿ z
￿h
h =Ah
if maxf1; ^ zg < zh < ￿ zh
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h =Al￿ ￿ wz
￿h
h =Ah
if maxf1; ^ zg < zh < ￿ zh
(22)







ps (z)dz = w
￿











Al ; ￿ w z
￿l




and ps (z) = (1 + q)pm (z). Similarly,























We present the analysis for the case ￿ zh < 1, but the argument that follows
can be mirrored for the other two cases in equation (22). Using (22) (under
the assumption ￿ zh < 1) to substitute in for @￿ zh






























































w￿1 = ￿ w
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where the last inequality follows from ￿ w
w￿1
￿l+1
￿l > 1, ￿ w = w, and
w
￿






































The ￿rst line is the budget constraint for high-skilled workers, and actual mar-
ket expenditures must be less than market expenditures when all output is
purchased as market services using high-skilled labor.
36Proof of Proposition 8. Taking as given the quantity and price of high-
skilled labor, f (t) = f and w(t) = w > ￿ Ah= ￿ Al (therefore, allocations will only
be a function of time through technology), recalling that ^ z < zl (t), and using
zh (t) < ^ z, the quantities consumer of services produced with low (Csjl (t)) and
high-skill (Csjh (t)) labor equal





Csjh (t) = f
Z ￿ zh(t)
^ z

































where these inequalities use 1
￿ zh(t)
@￿ zh(t)






@t > 0 from
Proposition 5.
In order to prove Proposition 9 we ￿rst prove a lemma stating that the share
of services produced with high-skill labor in total service consumption is greater
than the share of manufacturing goods produced with high-skilled labor in total
manufacturing consumption, provided w > ￿ Ah= ￿ Al and ￿ zh > ^ z.
Lemma 12 If w > ￿ Ah= ￿ Al, then Csjh=Cs > Cmjh=Cm.
Proof. The condition w > ￿ Ah= ￿ Al guarantees that there is a strict sorting of
skills into the production of di⁄erent wants, with low-skill workers producing
goods and services of complexity below ^ z, and high-skill workers producing the
most complex goods and services, z ￿ ^ z. This condition also guarantees that
￿ zh > ^ z, since otherwise, we would have that there is no market demand for
high-skilled labor, a clear contradiction of w > ￿ Ah= ￿ Al.





R maxf^ z;￿ zlg

















. Similarly, the share of manufactured goods















There are three cases to consider: i) ^ z < zh < zl, ii) zh < ^ z < zl ￿ ￿ zl < ￿ zh, and
iii) zh < zl = ￿ zl < ^ z < ￿ zh. In case i) we get
Csjh
Cs = 1 >
Cmjh
Cm , while in case iii)
we get
Csjh
Cs > 0 =
Cmjh
Cm . In case ii), zh < ^ z < zl < ￿ zl < ￿ zh (we focus on the
























































































































Proof of Proposition 9. The values of the time ￿ consumption baskets of
services and manufactured goods, respectively, equal





















where p(z;w) = min
￿
z￿l= ￿ Al;wz￿h= ￿ Ah
￿
. The evolution of a continuous time









































where the last inequality follows from the previous lemma.
Proof of Proposition 10
We proceed by establishing a series of lemmas.
Lemma 13 limt!1 e￿gtzh (t)
￿l+1 = 0, with limt!1
:
zh (t)=zh (t) = ￿h
￿l limt!1
:
￿ zh (t)=￿ zh (t).
Proof. Rearranging the ￿rst-order conditions of a high-skilled individual (see
























39Taking the limit as t ! 1 and using that limt!1
:
zh (t)=zh (t) ￿ limt!1
:















































where the ￿rst (weak) inequality follows from expenditures growth being bounded





Lemma 14 limt!1 ￿ zl (t)=￿ zh (t) = 1, with limt!1
:
￿ ze (t)=￿ ze (t) = g=(￿h + 1),
e = l;h.
Proof. In terms of the thresholds ze and ze , the budget constraint for high-



































































40Integrating and simplifying using w(t) = ￿ Ah= ￿ Al^ z(t)￿l￿￿h yields
[1(^ z > zh) + q]e￿gt (￿h ￿ ￿l) ^ z(t)￿l+1
￿ Al (￿l + 1)(￿h + 1)
￿e￿gt
"
[1 ￿ 1(^ z > zh)]
w(t)zh (t)
￿h+1
￿ Ah (￿h + 1)
+ 1(^ z > zh)
zh (t)
￿l+1




￿ Ah = (￿h + 1)
= w(t)
"
1 ￿ ￿(t) ￿ e￿gt zh (t)
￿l+1
￿ Al (￿l + 1)
#
where 1(^ z > zh) is an indicator taking the value 1 if ^ z (t) ￿ zh (t) and zero
otherwise. Taking the limit as t ! 1 and using limt!1 e￿gtzh (t)
￿h+1 ￿
limt!1 e￿gtzh (t)
￿l+1 = 0, and ^ z (t) < ￿ zl (t) ￿ ￿ zh (t); we obtain
[1(^ z > zh) + q](￿h ￿ ￿l) ^ Z
￿ Ah (￿l + 1)(￿h + 1)












where ^ Z ￿ limt!1 e￿gt^ z (t)
￿h+1 < 1, since low-skilled labor is bounded. Since
￿ is bounded between 0 and ￿ < 1; this implies







￿ zh (t)=￿ zh (t) = g=(￿h + 1).
Finally, rearranging the indi⁄erence condition between low- and high-skilled











taking the limit as t ! 1; and using that limt!1
:
ze (t)=ze (t) ￿ g=(￿l + 1)
< g=(￿h + 1) = limt!1
:










￿ zl (t)=￿ zl (t) = g=(￿h + 1).
For later use, we de￿ne ￿ Zl = limt!1 e￿gt￿ zl (t)
￿h+1, satisfying 0 < ￿ Zl < 1.
41Lemma 15 limt!1 w(t) ￿ ￿ w < 1.
Proof. In terms of the thresholds zl and zl, the budget constraint, see equation





























Recalling that ^ z (t) ￿ zl (t), integrating, and substituting in ^ Z yields:
q
(￿h ￿ ￿l) ^ Z
￿ Ah (￿l + 1)(￿h + 1)





￿ Ah (￿h + 1)




￿ Al (￿l + 1)
￿ 1
By Lemma 14, consumption of low-skilled individuals of services produced





￿ Ah(￿h+1) = ￿ Zl < 1. Therefore, since labor income (r.h.s) is ￿nite,
expenditures (l.h.s.) must also be ￿nite, hence limt!1 w(t) ￿ ￿ w < 1.
Lemma 16 limt!1 e￿gtzl (t)
￿l+1 = 0, with limt!1
:
zl (t)=zl (t) = ￿h
￿l g=(￿h + 1).
Proof. We ￿rst show that limt!1
zl(t)
￿ zl(t) < 1 by contradiction. The ￿rst order












































Given the ￿nite limiting wage w from the previous lemma, the ￿rst term of
the r.h.s. is in￿nite since ￿h < ￿l, while the min function is ￿nite, since the
second term is ￿nite. Thus, the in￿nite r.h.s. exceeds the ￿nite l.h.s., leading
to a contradiction. Thus, limt!1
zl(t)
￿ zl(t) < 1: We can then use the ￿rst-order
























42Taking the limit as t ! 1 and using that limt!1
:
zl (t)=zl (t) < limt!1
:
￿ zl (t)=￿ zl (t)
































The second equality follows from Lemma 14, and the inequality follows from




Lemma 17 limt!1 f (t) = 1.
Proof. By Lemma 15, w(t) ! w. This implies ^ z !
_
^ z < 1. Now demand for





Integrating this, the resource constraint ensures that demand cannot exceed
supply. Hence
(1 + q)e￿gt ^ z￿l+1
￿l + 1
￿ (1 ￿ f)
As t ! 1, the limit of the l.h.s. is zero, hence f ! 1, and ￿ ! ￿ ￿
Lemma 18 w = 1=
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
.
Proof. Consider the limiting budget constraints for high- and low-skilled agents
respectively.
(1 + q)(￿h ￿ ￿l) ^ Z
￿ Ah (￿l + 1)(￿h + 1)














(￿h ￿ ￿l) ^ Z
￿ Ah (￿l + 1)(￿h + 1)




￿ Ah (￿h + 1)




￿ Al (￿l + 1)
43We have already established that ^ Z = 0;limt!1 w(t) = w; and limt!1 e￿gtzl (t)
￿l+1,
and limt!1 ￿ zh (t) = limt!1 ￿ zl (t): Hence, the two equations imply:
w = 1=
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
Lemma 19 limt!1 cs (t) = 1 and limt!1 ys (t) = 1
1+q.
Proof. This results follows from Lemmas 13, 14, and 16, and the fact that
Cs (t) = (1 + q)Ys (t).
References
[1] Acemoglu, D. and V. Guerrieri. ￿Capital Deepening and Non-Balanced
Economic Growth.￿Journal of Political Economy, 2008, 116 (3), 467-498
[2] Baumol, William J. ￿Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The
Anatomy of the Urban Crisis,￿The American Economic Review 57 (1967)
: 415-426.
[3] Becker, G. S. and Murphy, K. ￿Education and Consumption: The E⁄ects
of Education in the Household Compared to the Marketplace,￿Journal of
Human Capital, 1 (Winter 2007): 9-35.
[4] Blagg, C.. ￿The History of Home Hemodialysis: A View from Seattle,￿
Home Hemodialysis International 1: p 1-7, 1997.
[5] Blagg, C. ￿It￿ s Time to Look at Home Hemodialysis in a New Light,￿in
Hemodialysis Horizons: Patient Safety & Approaches to Reducing Errors,
February 2006. http://www.aami.org/publications/hh/index.html.
[6] Bosworth, B. and J. Triplett. ￿Services Productivity in the United States:
Griliches￿Services Volume Revisited,￿in Hard-to-Measure Goods and Ser-
vices: Essays in Honor of Zvi Griliches, eds. E. R. Berndt and C. M. Hulten,
The University of Chicago Press, 2007.
[7] Buera, F. and Kaboski, J. ￿Scale and the Origins of Structural Change.￿
mimeo, 2008
[8] Caselli, F. ￿Technological Revolutions￿ , American Economic Review, 89
(March 1999):78-102
[9] Caselli, F. and Coleman, W. J., II, "The U.S. Structural Transformation
and Regional Convergence: A Reinterpretation," Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 109 (June 2001): 584-616.
[10] Clark, C. The Conditions of Economic Progress. London: Macmillan, 1941.
[11] Cohen, D. and Soto, M. ￿Growth and human capital: Good data, good
results￿Journal of Economic Growth, 12(1), 2007, 51-76.
44[12] Chenery H. Structural Change and Development Policy. Washington, D.C.:
Oxford University Press, for the World Bank (1979).
[13] Chenery H. and M. Syrquin. Patterns of Development. Oxford University
Press (1975).
[14] Clark, C. The Conditions of Economic Progress. London: Macmillan
(1941).
[15] de Vries, J. ￿The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution.￿
The Journal of Economic History 54 (2): 249-270 (1994).
[16] Echevarria, C. ￿Changes in Sectoral Composition Associated with Eco-
nomic Growth,￿International Economic Review 38 (1997): 431-452.
[17] Foellmi, R. and J. Zweimuller. ￿Structural Change, Engel￿ s Consumption
Cycles and Kaldor￿ s Facts of Economic Growth.￿ mimeo, University of
Zurich (2005).
[18] Fuchs, V. The Service Economy. New York: National Bureau of Economic
Research (1968).
[19] Goldin, C. and Katz, L., 1999, ￿The Returns to Skill in the United States
Across the Twentieth Century.￿NBER working paper WP 7126.
[20] Gollin, D., Parente, S. and Rogerson, R. ￿Farm Work, Home Work, and
International Productivity Di⁄erences,￿Review of Economic Dynamics, 7
(October 2004): 827-850
[21] Greenwood, J., A. Seshadri and M. Yorukoglu ￿Engines of Liberation.￿
Review of Economic Studies, Jan 2005, v.72, n.1: 109-134.
[22] Greenwood, J. and Yorukoglu, M., 1997. "1974," Carnegie-Rochester Con-
ference Series on Public Policy, 46 (1997): 49-95
[23] Griliches, Zvi, ed. Output Measurement in the Service Sectors. National
Bureau of Economic Research. Studies in Income and Wealth. Volume 56.
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
[24] Hall, R. and C. Jones. ￿The Value of Life and the Rise in Health Spending,￿
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122 (February 2007): 39-72
[25] Juhn, C., Murphy, K. M., and Pierce, B. ￿Wage Inequality and the Rise in
Returns to Skill.￿Journal of Political Economy, 101 (June 1993): 410-442
[26] Kaboski, J. 2004. ￿Supply Factors and the Mid-Century Fall in the Skill
Premium.￿mimeo, 2004
[27] Kaboski, J. 2009. "Education, Sectoral Composition and Growth," Review
of Economic Dynamics, 12 (January 2009): 168-182
45[28] Katouzian, M. A. ￿The Development of the Service Sector: A New Ap-
proach￿ , Oxford Economic Papers, 22 (3): 362-82 (1970).
[29] Kongsamut, P., S. Rebelo, and D. Xie. ￿Beyond Balanced Growth,￿Review
of Economic Studies 68 (2001): 869-882.
[30] Kravis, I., A. Heston and R. Summers. ￿The Share of Services in Economic
Growth,￿in Global Econometrics: Essays in Honor of Lawrence R. Klein,
eds. F. Gerard Adams and Bert G. Hickman, (1984).
[31] Kuznets, S. ￿Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations: II.
Industrial Distribution of National Product and Labor Force.￿Economic
Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 5, No. 4, Supplement (Jul., 1957),
pp. 1-111.
[32] Kuznets, S. ￿Modern Economic Growth: Findings and Re￿ ections.￿The
American Economic Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Jun., 1973), pp. 247-258.
[33] Lebergott, S. Consumer Expenditures: New Measures and Old Motives.
Princenton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
[34] Lee, D. and K. Wolpin. ￿Intersectoral Labor Mobility and the Growth of
the Service Sector,￿Econometrica, 47 (January, 2006), pp. 1-46.
[35] Locay, L. ￿Economic Development and the Division of Production between
Households and Markets.￿Journal of Political Economy, 98 (1990): 965-82.
[36] Maddison, A. ￿Growth and Slowdown in Advanced Capitalist Economies:
Techniques of Quantitative Assessment,￿Journal of Economic Literature
25 (1987): 649-698.
[37] Maddison, A. The World Economy. Paris, France : Development Centre of
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006.
[38] Martin, R. National Income in the United States, 1799-1938. National In-
dustrial Conference Board., 1939
[39] Matsuyama, K. ￿A Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods under
Nonhomothetic Preferences: Demand Complementarities, Income Distrib-
ution, and North-South Trade, Journal of Political Economy 108 (2000):
1093-1120.
[40] Matsuyama, K. ￿The Rise of Mass Consumption Societies,￿ Journal of
Political Economy 110 (2002): 1035-1070.
[41] Matsuyama, K. ￿Structural Change￿ , forthcoming in: New Palgrave Dic-
tionary of Economics, London, Macmillan (2005).
[42] Murphy, K., Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny ￿Income Distribution, Market Size,
and Industrialization,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (August 1989):
537-64.
46[43] National Resources Planning Board, Family Expenditures in the United
States: Statistical Tables and Appendixes, Washington: U.S. GPO, 1941,
209 pp.
[44] Ngai, R. and C. Pissarides. ￿Structural Change in a Multi-Sector Model of
Growth,￿American Economic Review 97 (March 2007) 429-443.
[45] Ngai, R. and C. Pissarides. ￿Trends in Hours and Economic Growth.￿Re-
view of Economic Dynamics, 11 (2). 2008: 239-256.
[46] Princiotta, N. and Bielick, S. ￿Homeschooling in the United States, 2003￿
National Center for Education Statistics, NCES 2006042, February 2006,
54 pp.
[47] Reid, M. Economics of household production. New York, J. Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 1934
[48] Rogerson, R. ￿Structural Transformation and the Deterioration of Euro-
pean Labor Market Outcomes￿Journal of Political Economy, 116 (2), 2008:
235-259
[49] Stigler, G. Trends in Employment in the Service Industries. National Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis, 59, General Series.
[50] Zweimuller, J. ￿Schumpeterian Entrepreneurs Meet Engel￿ s Law: The Im-
pact of Inequality on Innovation-Driven Growth,￿ Journal of Economic
Growth, 5 (June 2000): 185-206
47 































*Services includes services, retail and wholesale trade, public administration, utilities, and 
transportation. 
 





























High Skill Services: Consumption
Low Skill Services: Consumption
High Skill Services: Value Added
Low Skill Services: Value Added
*High-skill services include all industries with at least 12.5% of workers college-educated in 1940. 
 






































































































































































Fraction of Labor College-Educated 
Figure 5: Decomposition of the Growth Service Consumption in the Model. See footnote 30 for 
a discussion of the parameter values used in the simulation.  
Figure 6: Simulation of the Quantity and Price of High-Skill Labor (upper panel), and Home 
Production Time (lower panel). 
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College-High School Relative Wage